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One of the striking characteristics of the 1970's - which persisted into the
first half of the 1980's - was the divergence of the economic performances of
the major industrial democracies. Though the differences within Europe
were great,
1none was perhaps so dramatic as the reversal of the pattern of
high unemployment and slow growth in the United States and tight employ-
ment and rapid growth in Europe which had characterized much of the
previous post-War period.
After the first oil shock, American labor markets and the American
economy were able to absorb the additional unemployment, contain the
additional inflation, and resume moderate growth. The consequences of the
second oil shock were more severe worldwide, but by the mid-1980's, the
American economy had again contained its outburst of inflation and was
resuming real growth. In Europe, on the other hand, unemployment mounted
through most of the 1970's and 1980's, inflation persisted, and growth
disappeared. By the middle of the 1980's, many of the nations of Europe had
remarkably high unemployment and slow growth.
Even casual observation suggested that it was differences in structure
rather than differences in policies that were primarily responsible for these
contrasting responses to the oil shocks. All of the industrial economies had,
after all, faced essentially the same oil and commodity price increases. Yet
some experienced markedly less difficulty with both inflation and unemploy-
ment than others.
2
Both the inflationary nature of the oil shocks and the prevalence of
inflationary pressures world-wide in the preceding decade, pointed to the
strategicimportanceof wageprice relationships.Several European
economists, notably Herbert Giersch, identified the rigidity of the real wage
1 See, for example, the differences between France and Germany described and analyzed by
Georges de Menu and Uwe Westphal, 1982, The Transmission of International Disturbances: A
French-German Cliometric Analysis, 1972-1980, in the third annual International Seminar
volume, European Economic Review, vol. 18, no. 1/2.
2 The difference between European and American performances in the preceding decades - in
that age of innocence when Phillips curves were not yet vertical and supply shocks were
unimportant - seems, by contrast, to have been in part a reflection of differences in the
willingness on the two sides of the Atlantic to use discretionary Keynesian policies to exploit the
ephemeral rewards of moving up the Phillips curve.8 Introduction to Part I
- protected by de jure and de facto indexation and by pervasive social
pressures - as a central structural impediment to successful adjustment in
Europe. William Branson and Julio Rotemberg, inspired bya lecture by
Giersch at Princeton in 1978, developed the first model and analytical study
of the implications of real wage rigidity for macroeconomic policy inan
international setting. The introduction to theirpaper, 'International Adjust-
ment With Wage Rigidity', which is the lead article in this volume, succinctly
summarizes the macroeconomic policy debate between Europe and the
United States in the late 1970's, and points to the flexibility of thereal wage
in the United States- where inflation is relatively free to reduce the
purchasing power of contractually fixed nominalwages - as the key to the
success of its expansionary policies.
They suggest that real wage rigidity in Europe wouldcause the same
expansionary policies to produce more inflation but notmore output. The
unstated implication is that the coordination of macroeconomic policiesin
interdependent countries with differing degrees of realwage rigidity calls for
asymmetric combinations of both supply and demand policies.
Even as the policymakers of Europe and the United States struggled with
adjustment problems in the 1980s, they never lost sight of theeventual
objective of a return to steady growth. A lively interest in the determinantsof
growth thus persisted on both sides of the Atlantic. In 'Comparing Productiv-
ity Growth: An Exploration of French and United States Industrialand Firm
Data,' Zvi Griliches and Jacques Mairesse providean example of the light
that careful, comparative econometric analysis of firm datacan throw on
these issues. The authors examine and ultimately rejecta set of 'single-cause'
hypotheses proposed by others to explain the productivity slowdown. Their
findings are that neither slower growth in the accumulation of either physical
capital or research and development (R&D) capital,nor the post-1972
increase in the relative price of raw materials,appears to explain any
appreciable share of the productivity slowdown in France and the U.S.
The authors base their findings on an ambitious research project which
involved assembling, partly from previously unpublished data,a new set of
comparable information on key variables, using consistent definitions, for 15
manufacturing industries and over 500 firms in the two countriesover the
period 1967-1978. The data for output and inputwere used to compute
growth rates of total factor productivity (TFP) for each firm, industry, and
country. TFP growth was higher in France than in the U.S. not only for
manufacturing as a whole, but also for each industry separately. In both
countries productivity growth slowed hereafter witha somewhat greater
slowdown in the U.S.
Much of their paper is devoted to a detailed examination and ultimate
rejection of several single-cause explanations. They showno tendency for
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increases in energy prices to exhibit relatively large slowdowns in TFP
growth. Similarly, R & D does not help, both because there was only a modest
slowdown in the ratio of R&D spending to GNP in the U.S., and also
because France has an even lower R&D-to-GNP ratio than the U.S. yet
achieves faster productivity growth across-the-board. The most positive as-
pect of this part of the study is the confirmation of previous estimates that
the overall gross rate of return to investment in R&D is about 25 percent.
Intractable real wages are not the only structural rigidities that can have
an effect on economic performance. The thirst for remedies to Europe's
stagnation inspired a resurgence of studies of institutions and policies at the
microeconomic level which hinder adaptation. The 1986 meeting of the
International Seminar (published in the European Economic Review in 1987),
was devoted exclusively to supply side impediments to growth. Three of the
papers presented then, and reproduced in this volume, give a sense of the
varieties of comparative and empirical work which the Seminar has pro-
moted.
In 'Housing Markets, Unemployment and Labour Market Flexibility in the
U.K.', Gordon Hughes and Barry McCormick show graphically how housing
policies have unwittingly reduced the mobility of workers in that country.
They document with micro data the fact that the inevitable queues for public
and rent-subsidized housing are a strong disincentive to mobility. In an
interesting speculative part of the paper (part 4), they examine the relation-
ship between geographic mobility and the NAIRU, and conjecture further
that there may be a relationship between the low level of geographic mobility
and aspects of unionism in Britain: 'When mobility is costly, workers have an
increased incentive to ... join and be active in unions ... [and] the choices
of the unions (for example, whether to strike or not) [tend to foster]
adversarial ... managementunion relations [of the kind which are one]
traditional explanation of low U.K. productivity.'
In both Europe and the United States, the reputed flexibility of the
Japanese economy has been a recurrent standard of comparison for studies
of structural rigidities and macroeconomic performance. In 'Labour Market
Flexibility in Japan in Comparison with Europe and the U.S.', Toshiaki
Tachibanaki provides an empirical survey of the differences between these
labor markets and analyzes their contribution to macroeconomic perfor-
mance. The array of differences is impressive: the high mobility of labor, the
importance of the share of part-time and self-employed labor, the flexibility
of hours and wages, the relative weakness of social policy toward labor, etc.
Tachibanaki iscareful to warn against extrapolating simplistically from
Japanese experience to the possible consequences of following the 'Japanese
model' in Europe or the United States.
This volume, Chapter 3 pp. 101-102.10 Introduction to Part I
In the last paper in Volume I, we move from econometric studies of
markets based on panels of microdata to highly aggregated time-series
analysis. In 'Productivity, Wages, and Prices Inside and Outside of Manufac-
turing in the U.S., Japan, and Europe,' Robert J. Gordon studies for
1964-1984 the comparative dynamic behavior of annual serieson prices,
wages, output and productivity in the U.S., Japan, and a composite he calls
'Europe' (a fixed-weight aggregate of eleven countries in and out of the EC).
Gordon emphasizes the differences between his results and that of the
previous literature on inflation and productivity in Europe. One of the
central issues in that literature is the assertion that excessive realwages were
a significant cause of the unemployment of the1970sand1980sthroughout
the OECD and particularly in Europe. Bruno and Sachs, for instance,report
high and rising values in eight OECD countries during that period of the
'real wage gap' - defined conceptually as the difference between the real
product wage and its market-clearing value. " This concept is relatedto the
emphasis that Branson and Rotemberg, interpreting Giersch, placedon real
wage rigidity and the potential for excessive real wages in Europe.
Gordon points out that much of the earlier evidence is based exclusively
on data for real wages and productivity in manufacturing, and does not apply
to the larger, nonmanufacturing sector, where data problemsare much
greater. One of the unique features of his study is its systematic exploitation
of published and unpublished data on nonmanufacturingaggregates, and one
of his most striking results is the finding that the realwage gap in nonmanu-
facturingdeclinesover the1970sin both the United States and in his
European aggregate. His finding for the wage gap in manufacturing- which
rises more in his European countries than in the UnitedStates over the
1970s,and then reverses itself- is not inconsistent with other findings. But
the decline which he finds in the nonmanufacturing sector is sufficientto
leave the economy-wide wage gap unchanged over the period in both
Gordon's European aggregate and the United States.
As Gordon points out, this striking result for nonmanufacturing is inpart
attributable to his inclusion of 100 percent of the income of self-employed
persons in his measure of labor compensation in nonmanufacturing. Allocat-
ing this volatile series- which includes the incomes (particularly significant
in Europe) of farmers, artisans, and shopkeepers- more to capital income
and less to labor income would alter the result.
In the econometric section of his paper, Gordon estimates extended
Phillips-type wage equations, price equations, and the partial reduced form
relating prices to output for both manufacturing and the residualnonmanu-
facturing sector in the three regions. His direct and indirect estimates of the
" Michael Bruno and JeffreyD. Sachs 1985, The Economics of Worldwide Stagflation. (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA) Chapters 9 and 10.Introduction to Part I 11
reduced-form response of prices to output- a measure of sensitivity of
inflation to excess demand- are about the same in the U.S. as in the
European aggregate. He concludes that nominal prices and wages have a
similarly low degree of sensitivity to excess supply and demand in both
regions.
Gordon's paper is not exclusively contrarian. It confirms the consensus of
empirical studies in this area on a number of significant points- notably the
importance of autonomous wage push episodes in the late 1960s and early
1970s as a source of higher real wages, and hence lower employment, in both
Europe and Japan. He finds that the wage explosions of those periodsare
best captured by highly significant dummy variables, whose indirect effecton
employment he then further documents. This result rejoins some of the
concerns of Giersch and other European commentators.